The Scientific and Contemplative Exploration of Consciousness
B. Alan Wallace

© B. Alan Wallace. All rights reserved.

Published in Network: The Scientific and Medical Network Review, Dec., 2002, No. 80, pp. 18-19.

As we enter the twenty-first century and look back on the past four hundred years

of scientific progress, who can fail to be impressed by the frontiers of knowledge that

have been opened to human inquiry? The physical sciences have illuminated the

realm of the extremely minute—the inner core of the atomic nucleus; events in the

distant past—the first nanoseconds after the Big Bang; and phenomena on the far

side of the universe—the constitution of galactic clusters billions of light years away.

In the meantime, the biological sciences have made great discoveries concerning the

evolution of life, they have mapped the human genome, and revealed many of the

inner workings of the brain. But in the midst of such extraordinary knowledge of the

objective world, the subjective realm of consciousness remains largely an enigma.

While neuroscientists examine the brain correlates to the workings of the human

spirit, the actual nature of the mind/body correlation is still a matter of philosophical

conjecture: there is no hard scientific evidence that explains how the mind is related to

the brain. There is no scientific consensus concerning the definition of consciousness,

and there are no objective, scientific means of detecting the presence or absence of

consciousness in anything, mineral, plant, animal, or human. In short, scientists have

not yet fathomed the nature of consciousness, its origins, or its role in nature.

How is it possible that something so central to scientific inquiry, namely

human consciousness, remains so elusive? Is it because it is inherently mysterious or

even impenetrable to scientific inquiry? Or have scientists simply failed thus far to

devise appropriate methods for exploring the frontiers of the inner spirit? To seek an

answer to this question, let us review the ways in which scientists have successfully

explored other realms of the natural world.

Looking first to the physical sciences, astronomy began to move beyond its

medieval heritage when researchers such as Tycho Brahe devised instruments for

making unprecedentedly accurate measurements of the relative movements of the

planets. Whereas previous generations of astrologers were content to focus

primarily on the alleged correlations between the movements of celestial bodies and

terrestrial events, Brahe made careful observations of the planets themselves, albeit

with the intention to improve the precision of astrological predictions. Similarly,

Galileo made precise observations of falling bodies and other terrestrial and celestial

phenomena. In short, careful observations of these natural phenomena themselves

were the necessary basis for the subsequent explanation of why these physical

phenomena act as they do.

The life sciences developed in a similar way. In the seventeenth century, the

Dutch naturalist Van Leeuwenhoek used the microscope to observe minute

organisms, and over the centuries this combination of technology and precise

observation of living organisms led to the development of cell biology, molecular

biology, genetics, and neuroscience. It is important to bear in mind, however, that

what these physicists and biologists were observing were appearances to the human

mind, not external, physical objects existing independently of consciousness. The

mind has always played a central role in scientific observation and analysis, yet the

scientific study of the mind did not even begin until three hundred years had lapsed

from the time of Galileo. The obvious assumption behind this long delay was that

consciousness plays no significant role in nature. But this is a metaphysical

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assumption, not a scientific conclusion. Whether or not that hypothesis is a valid one,

it is certainly an oversight to postpone for three centuries the scientific examination

of one’s primary instrument of observation of the natural world: human

consciousness.

At the dawn of the modern science of the mind in the late nineteenth century,

the pioneering American psychologist William James defined this discipline as the

study of subjective mental phenomena, their relations to their objects, to the brain,

and to the rest of the world (1892). He argued that introspective observation must

always be the first and foremost method by which to study these issues, for this is

our sole access for observing mental phenomena directly (1890/1950: I: 185). This

approach parallels that of Tycho Brahe, Galileo, and Van Leeuwenhoek in the

development of astronomy, physics, and biology, respectively: carefully observe the

phenomena themselves, before trying to explain their origins or the mechanical laws

governing their movements. William James added that introspective study of

subjective mental events should be complemented with the objective examination of

their behavioral and neural correlates. Since his time, great advances have been

made in the behavioral sciences, and even more stunning progress is taking place in

the brain sciences. But James’s emphasis on the importance of introspectively

observing subjective mental phenomena themselves has been largely ignored, so

there has been no comparable development of rigorous methods for observing and

experimenting with one’s own mental phenomena firsthand.

Progress in astronomy before the time of Brahe and Kepler was hampered by

both empirical and theoretical limitations. Empirically, medieval astrologers and

astronomers failed to devise new, rigorous methods for the precise observation of

celestial bodies. They were too caught up in their concern with the terrestrial

correlates of celestial events. Theoretically, their research was limited by their

unquestioning acceptance of the metaphysical assumptions of Aristotle, Christian

theology, and astrology. In a similar fashion, contemporary behavioral and

neuroscientific research into the mind is empirically limited by the absence of

rigorous methods for observing mental phenomena firsthand. And theoretically,

such inquiry is hampered by the metaphysical assumption that all mental events can

be reduced to their neural correlates. This materialist premise is not a scientific

conclusion, but an assumption that underlies virtually all scientific research into the

mind/body problem.

It is with introspection alone that consciousness and a wide range of other

mental phenomena can be examined directly. While this subjective mode of

perception is still marginalized by the cognitive sciences, the contemplative traditions

of the world have for centuries devised a wide range of methods for rigorously

exploring the frontier of the inner spirit. Long before the time of Aristotle, the

contemplatives of India, for example, devised sophisticated means of refining the

attention, stilling compulsive thoughts, and enhancing the clarity of awareness. This

discipline is known as the development of samadhi, or deep meditative concentration,

which was then used to explore firsthand a wide range of mental phenomena

(Wallace 1998).

In profoundly stilling the mind, Hindu and Buddhist contemplatives have

allegedly probed beyond the realm of the ordinary human mind to an underlying

substrate consciousness. In their view, experientially corroborated by hundreds of

contemplatives throughout Asia, many of them adhering to diverse philosophical

and religious beliefs, the human mind emerges not from the brain, but from this

underlying substrate which carries on from one life to the next. This substrate

consciousness need not be reified into a kind of ethereal substance, or immutable

soul, but viewed more as a continuum of cumulative experience that carries on after

death. In each lifetime, this stream of consciousness is conditioned by the body,

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brain, and environment with which it is conjoined. In the context of such an

embodiment, specific mental processes are contingent upon specific brain processes.

The brain is necessary for the manifestation of those mental functions once the

substrate consciousness is embodied, but it and its interaction with the environment

are not sufficient for the occurrence of consciousness. Memories and character traits

from one life to the next are stored in this substrate, not in the brain, and past-life

memories can allegedly be recalled while in samadhi. However, if specific brain

functions are impaired, one may lose access to their correlated mental functions as

long as the substrate consciousness is conjoined with a body.

Pythagoras, Plato, Origen (a highly influential, third-century Christian

theologian), and much of the Christian community during the first four centuries of

the common era affirmed the continuity of individual consciousness from one life to

the next. While Augustine thought that souls are likely created due to conditions

present at the time of conception, he acknowledged that, as far as he knew, the truth

of this hypothesis had not been demonstrated (391/1937: III: Chs. 20-21). Moreover,

he declared that it was consonant with the Christian faith to believe that souls exist

prior to conception and incarnate by their own choice (Ibid.: 379). This subject, he

claimed, had not been studied sufficiently by Christians to be able to decide the issue.

Acceptance of the theory of reincarnation in the Western world decreased from the

fifth century onwards due to its condemnation by ecclesiastical councils and the

decline of contemplative practice in general and the cultivation of deep meditative

concentration in particular.

The theory of the substrate consciousness and its relation to the human mind

has not been invalidated by contemporary neuroscience. While William James did

not advocate reincarnation, he believed that the relation of the brain to the mind is

akin to that of a prism refracting light, rather than mental events originating from

the brain (1989: 85-86). He declared that this non-materialist view was compatible

with the neuroscientific knowledge of his day, and this remains true today, so there

are no purely scientific grounds for assuming a materialist view of the mind. While

materialists claim that the burden of proof of the non-physical nature of the mind

rests on those who can provide evidence to that effect, this is open to question.

Introspective observation of mental phenomena does not suggest that they are

physical in nature, nor does it provide knowledge of the brain. Likewise, the study of

neural events alone provides no knowledge of the mind: one never sees any mental

events in the brain, just electrochemical events. So it takes a leap of faith to believe

that mental events are really brain functions viewed from a subjective perspective.

Generally speaking, if one believes that two types of phenomena that appear to be

radically different are in fact identical, the burden of proof lies in demonstrating their

equivalence.

Is the belief that the mind is nothing more than a function, or emergent

property, of the brain a scientific hypothesis? If so, there should be some way, at

least in principle, to falsify that claim. Otherwise, it loses its status as a scientific

theory. Insofar as scientific research on the mind/body problem is confined to the

study of the behavioral and neural correlates of the subjective experience, it is hard

to imagine how one could ever test for the existence of non-physical mental events.

One would need to step outside materialist methodologies in order to detect

anything non-physical. One viable way to put the materialist hypothesis to the test,

thereby establishing its status as a scientific theory, is by studying the empirical

evidence suggestive of reincarnation. Such research has been done not only by

contemplatives exploring their past-life memories but by modern researchers, such

as psychiatrist Ian Stevenson (1997). His remarkable work, however, has received

little attention by the scientific community.

The reason for this may be quite simple. As neurologist Antonio Damasio

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comments, many neuroscientists are guided by one goal and one hope: to

thoroughly explain how neural patterns become subjectively experienced mental

events (1999: 322). So they do not welcome empirical evidence that might suggest

that the goal of their research is illusory. This situation is reminiscent of the goal of

medieval astronomers to demonstrate how all celestial bodies move in perfect circles.

Eventually, Kepler, who was also committed to this belief, was distressed when the

empirical evidence accumulated by Tycho Brahe forced him to conclude that this

long-held assumption was false.

With the union of scientific and contemplative inquiry, humanity may explore

the frontier of the inner spirit in unprecedented ways (Wallace 2000). The importance

of such collaborative research can hardly be overestimated. The very nature of

human identity is at stake, and those who are committed to the pursuit of truth must

be rely on rigorous, empirical research, even if it invalidates their most cherished

assumptions.

Augustine. (391/1937) The Free Choice of the Will. Francis E. Tourscher (trans.).

Philadelphia: The Peter Reilly Co.

James, William. (1890/1950) The Principles of Psychology. New York: Dover

Publications.

———(1892) “A plea for psychology as a science.” Philosophical Review, 1, 146-153.

———(1989) Essays in Religion and Morality. Cambridge. Mass.: Harvard University

Press.

Stevenson, Ian, M.D. (1997) Where Reincarnation and Biology Intersect. Westport, CN:

Praeger.

———(2000) The Taboo of Subjectivity: Toward a New Science of Consciousness. New

York: Oxford University Press.

Reprinted with permission of Templeton Foundation Press from the forthcoming